The serial number of the unit can be found on the data tag in the drive area and it is also stamped in the end of the drive shaft opposite the driven sheave. Each piece of Carrier equipment is custom designed. The serial number is our identification number for parts lists, drawings, operational manuals, etc.
Angle of Attack serial number
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The serial number can be found on the lower right-hand corner of the final certified drawings located in your Installation & Operational Manual. A typical serial number will be a five-digit number, i.e. S/N 27111.
The angle of attack can be determined by reading the approximated angle of the two circles in motion, i.e. 45 deg. to 90 deg. The angle of attack affects the product conveying speed as well as drying and cooling. The correct angle of attack can be found on the final certified drawings. The procedure to achieve the correct drive-timing angle can be found in your Installation & Operational Manual.
All exchange transactions are based on the return of a repairable core within 30 days of the same model and part number as supplied to the customer. A repairable core is defined as a part that is not corroded,excessively damaged, missing the data plate/serial number, or contains obsolete service parts that are no longer available from the original equipment manufacturer.
Other specific serial number and/or core conditions may apply. Prototype/preproduction units may not be accepted as cores. Customer will be made aware of any other conditions at the time when order is placed.
Full Swing: Ball speed, club speed, smash factor, carry distance, launch angle, spin rate, apex height, flight time, angle of attack, spin loft, launch direction, spin axis, roll distance, total distance, lateral landing, shot dispersion, shot type
Chipping: Ball speed, club speed, smash factor, carry distance, launch angle, spin rate, height, flight time, angle of attack, spin loft, launch direction, spin axis, roll distance, total distance, lateral landing, shot dispersion
4) Buyers are encouraged to email support@flightscopemevo.com with the item's serial number (printed on the back of the unit) to inquire if the seller is the registered owner, and if the item is blacklisted (e.g. known to be lost or stolen).
Sophisticated mathematical methods are used to follow the club along its trajectory and determine important measures such as swing plane angle, attack angle, and path, apart from club speed at impact.
What we want to do now is to try to apply a bit of the CFD data and analysis to the real-world application of using this airfoil on a vehicle. First, we will first need to change a few things around. The first thing to change is the environment, because the mounted airfoil (both the center and outer sections) will never truly see any free-stream air flow. Even though the outer sections of the airfoil may be positioned beyond the vehicle's roof and body, and even though the air flow may be "cleaner" or be more parallel to the ground plane, the air around the sides of the vehicle is still affected such that it can no longer be considered to be free-stream air. Secondly, since we can no longer define angle with respect to the relative motion of free-stream air flow, it is helpful to introduce and use an additional term called "pitch." Previously, we had defined the AOA as the difference in angle between the center cross-section of the reference plane (a.k.a. "center reference line") and the vector that represents the relative motion of the undisturbed free-stream air flow. We will define pitch as the difference in angle between the center cross-section of the reference plane (a.k.a. "reference line") and a non-sloped ground plane that is parallel to the vehicle's direction of travel. A ruler that is placed on top of the center section of the GTC-series airfoil would be the real-life equivalent of the reference line. Additionally, to simplify the angle references and avoid confusion with AOA numbers, we will use only absolute values (i.e. positive numbers), in conjunction with either upward pitch (front higher than the rear) or downward pitch (front lower than the rear).
Bonin took manual control of the aircraft. Without the autopilot, turbulence caused the aircraft to start to roll to the right, and Bonin reacted by deflecting his side-stick to the left. One consequence of the change to ALT2 was an increase in the aircraft's sensitivity to roll, and the pilot overcorrected. During the next 30 seconds, the aircraft rolled alternately left and right as he adjusted to the altered handling characteristics of the aircraft.[74] At the same time, he abruptly pulled back on his side-stick, raising the nose. This action was unnecessary and excessive under the circumstances.[75] The aircraft's stall warning briefly sounded twice because the angle-of-attack tolerance was exceeded, and the aircraft's indicated airspeed dropped sharply from 274 knots (507 km/h; 315 mph) to 52 knots (96 km/h; 60 mph). The aircraft's angle of attack increased, and the aircraft subsequently began to climb above its cruising altitude of 35,000 ft (FL350). During this ascent, the aircraft attained vertical speeds well in excess of the typical rate of climb for the Airbus A330, which usually ascend at rates no greater than 2000 feet per minute (10 m/s). The aircraft experienced a peak vertical speed close to 7,000 feet per minute (36 m/s; 130 km/h),[74] which occurred as Bonin brought the rolling movements under control.
At 02:11:10 UTC, the aircraft had climbed to its maximum altitude around 38,000 feet (11,582 m). At this point, the aircraft's angle of attack was 16, and the engine thrust levers were in the fully forward takeoff/go-around (TOGA) detent. As the aircraft began to descend, the angle of attack rapidly increased toward 30. A second consequence of the reconfiguration into ALT2 was that the stall protection no longer operated, whereas in normal law, the aircraft's flight-management computers would have acted to prevent such a high angle of attack.[80] The wings lost lift and the aircraft began to stall.[4][page needed]
At 02:11:40 UTC, Captain Dubois re-entered the cockpit after being summoned by Robert.[40] The angle of attack had then reached 40, and the aircraft had descended to 35,000 feet (10,668 m) with the engines running at almost 100% N1 (the rotational speed of the front intake fan, which delivers most of a turbofan engine's thrust). The stall warnings stopped, as all airspeed indications were now considered invalid by the aircraft's computer because of the high angle of attack.[82] The aircraft had its nose above the horizon, but was descending steeply.
Roughly 20 seconds later, at 02:12 UTC, Bonin decreased the aircraft's pitch slightly. Airspeed indications became valid, and the stall warning sounded again; it then sounded intermittently for the remaining duration of the flight, stopping only when the pilots increased the aircraft's nose-up pitch. From there until the end of the flight, the angle of attack never dropped below 35. From the time the aircraft stalled until its impact with the ocean, the engines were primarily developing either 100% N1 or TOGA thrust, though they were briefly spooled down to about 50 percent N1 on two occasions. The engines always responded to commands and were developing in excess of 100 percent N1 when the flight ended. Robert responded to Dubois by saying, "We've lost all control of the aeroplane, we don't understand anything, we've tried everything".[40] Soon after this, Robert said to himself, "climb" four consecutive times. Bonin heard this and replied, "But I've been at maximum nose-up for a while!" When Captain Dubois heard this, he realized Bonin was causing the stall, and shouted, "No no no, don't climb! No No No!"[83][40]
In a July 2011 article in Aviation Week, Chesley "Sully" Sullenberger was quoted as saying the crash was a "seminal accident" and suggested that pilots would be able to better handle upsets of this type if they had an indication of the wing's angle of attack (AoA).[252] By contrast, aviation author Captain Bill Palmer has expressed doubts that an AoA indicator would have saved AF447, writing: "as the PF [pilot flying] seemed to be ignoring the more fundamental indicators of pitch and attitude, along with numerous stall warnings, one could question what difference a rarely used AoA gauge would have made".[253]
The final BEA report points to the human-computer interface (HCI) of the Airbus as a possible factor contributing to the crash. It provides an explanation for most of the pitch-up inputs by the pilot flying, left unexplained in the Popular Mechanics piece: namely that the flight director display was misleading.[257] The pitch-up input at the beginning of the fatal sequence of events appears to be the consequence of an altimeter error. The investigators also pointed to the lack of a clear display of the airspeed inconsistencies, though the computers had identified them. Some systems generated failure messages only about the consequences, but never mentioned the origin of the problem. The investigators recommended a blocked pitot tube should be clearly indicated as such to the crew on the flight displays. The Daily Telegraph pointed out the absence of AoA information, which is so important in identifying and preventing a stall.[258] The paper stated, "though angle of attack readings are sent to onboard computers, there are no displays in modern jets to convey this critical information to the crews." Der Spiegel indicated the difficulty the pilots faced in diagnosing the problem: "One alarm after another lit up the cockpit monitors. One after another, the autopilot, the automatic engine control system, and the flight computers shut themselves off."[259] Against this backdrop of confusing information, difficulty with aural cognition (due to heavy buffeting from the storm, as well as the stall) and zero external visibility, the pilots had less than three minutes to identify the problem and take corrective action. The Der Spiegel report asserts that such a crash "could happen again". 2ff7e9595c
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